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L

ocal governance and the municipality
have a long history and tradition in Latin
America going back to colonial times.1 It
was only after the 1980s, and for many
countries only in the last decade, that
genuine decentralization reform efforts
have come to invigorate and enhance the
role of local governments. However,
despite some significant progress to date,
many challenges still remain for munici
palities to play a vibrant and meaningful
role in the delivery of public services and
to contribute to improve the daily lives of
Latin American citizens.2

In the last two decades the Latin American
region has seen a general trend toward an
increased level of fiscal decentralization.
Using the measure of sub-national
expenditures as percent of national ex
penditures, fiscal decentralization increa
sed from an average of 13 percent in 1985
to 19 percent in 2005; using the measure
of sub-national expenditures as percent of
GDP decentralization increased from 5.5
percent in 2000 to 6.6 percent in 2007.
However, there are significant variations in
these trends across countries in the
region.3 Overall, increased decentrali
zation can be detected in the devolution of
new responsibilities which includes the
environment, the fight against poverty,
and an increase in decentralized ex
penditures for education, health, etc. Less
progress can be detected in the devolution
of autonomous revenue sources.
Recent times have seen a variety of
innovations in the region that have
attracted interest from all corners of the
world, such as ranking systems' local
performance in Brazil and Colombia, per
client based transfers for health and
education in Chile, or fighting poverty with
direct transfers to families administered
by municipalities in Brazil. A good number
of countries have embarked or are consi

dering significant reforms that that will
further strengthen municipal autonomy.
For instance, Bolivia has recently approved
a new Constitution to allow for better
representation of different ethnic groups
at the sub-national level; Uruguay lately
introduced a third tier of government
made up of 89 new municipalities; and
Costa Rica only just approved the "Ley
General de Transferencia de Competencias
y Recursos a los Municipios" which
provides the ability to transfer 10 percent
of the national budget resources to the
municipalities, clearing the way for
local
governments to assume new
competencies and improve the quality of
services and infrastructure. In El Salvador
the association of municipalities (COMURES)
is maintaining an active dialog with central
authorities to increase the funding and
general stability of the general transfer
system (FODES) which represents between
70-80 percent of local budgets, and was
expected to reach 9 percent of the national
budget in 2009 but because of the crisis it
attained only 7.5 percent of the national
budget.
On the other hand, there are countries
in the region where some trends have moved
toward some forms of recentralization.
For example, in Argentina the Law of
Economic Emergency of 2002 and the
Budget Law of 2006 have given central
authorities increased discretion to assign
federal funds or unilaterally interrupt their
disbursement. In the Dominican Republic
there have been elements of recen
tralization with the Municipal Law of
2007 establishing fixed budget shares
for different types of expenditures on
personnel, services, public infrastructure,
and so on; it is also feared that the new
constitution will lead to the general
transfer fund of 10 percent of the state
budget established in 2003 (but never
implemented). Similarly, in Peru recent

1.

See United Cities and
Local Governments
2008 GOLD I report.

2.

The effectiveness of
decentralization efforts
has varied
considerably across
countries of the Latin
America region. In the
last decade,
decentralization has
moved at a fast pace
in countries such as
Colombia and Peru but
it continues to be
stagnant after several
decades of planning
and legal measures in
countries such as the
Dominican Republic
and Haiti. Besides
Brazil and all the
Spanish-speaking
countries of Latin
America, this paper
covers also Haiti,
Jamaica, and Trinidad
and Tobago. As
shorthand, all the
countnes will be
addressed in this
paper as Latin
Amenca.

3.

See, for example,
Daughters and Harper
(2007).
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4.

The focus of this report
is on fiscal
decentralization.
Issues of political and
administrative
decentralization for the
most part are not
covered.

5.

Naturally, these
countries are not
usually classified as
"Latin" America.

6.

In the technical
parlance the vertical
relationships between
different levels of
government are
bifurcated (central to
local and central to
regional, separately)
as opposed to
hierarchical (central to
regional to local, all
linked).

7.

In contrast, for
example, the Brazilian
Constitution defines its
political system as the
union of the central
government, the
states, and the
municipalities, thus
giving local
governments an
autonomous standing
vis-a-vis the
intermediate level
governments.

8.

Brazilian states also
have some limited role
in managing the
municipalities.

legislation has revoked the municipalities'
prerogative to issue building licenses and
rezoning of land use. The regular transfer
funds allocated to municipalities have
been significantly reduced from 2009 to
2011 (a decline of 22 percent in the last
five years). In Colombia, the central
government has recently decided to
directly allocate resources for water and
sanitation that until then had been
assigned
to
municipal
governments
(through a fiduciary fund administrated by
Central Government). Finally, in Venezuela
the municipal authorities have been
denouncing the continuous curtailment of
competencies and resources and the
increasing encroachment of the central
authorities in local matters.
This report takes an in-depth look at the
current state of the local public finances in
the Latin America region, identifies and
analyzes some of the main challenges for
improving efficiency, equity and effecti
veness in the delivery of public services
and for promoting development and it
closes by offering a set of observations
concerning policy reform.4
Structure and Performance
of Local Government Finances
in the Region
Countries in the region are highly diverse
along a number of dimensions: federal
versus unitary, size, colonial tradition, etc.
This diversity is found first among the four
federal countries in the region: Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Among the
countries with a unitary system we can
identify clusters of countries with more
similar institutions and current challenges,
including the Andean countries (Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia), the generally
smaller countries of Central America, the
Island States with non-Iberian traditions,5
and what we could call the southern cone

exceptions (Paraguay, Uruguay and espe
cially Chile) because of their approach to
fiscal decentralization. The diversity is also
found in population size (from the 196
million of Brazil to the one million of
Trinidad and Tobago), in real GDP per
capita (from $9,357 in Argentina in 2007
in constant 2000 US dollars to $884 in
Nicaragua and only $411 in Haiti), and in
other dimensions.
However, there are also many common
features in the way municipalities are
structured, which enables us to observe all
municipal governments in the region from
a common perspective. An important
feature is that for those countries with
more than one tier of sub-national
government, the relationship between the
central government and the municipalities
is for the most part directly between these
two levels as opposed to the central
government dealing exclusively with the
regional and local governments and then
the latter dealing exclusively with the
municipalities.6 In most cases, the legal
status of the municipalities is clearly
stated in the constitution or specialized
laws, such as municipal codes. The most
important exception to this rule is
Argentina where the constitution gives the
intermediate
level
government,
the
provinces, discretion to structure the fiscal
arrangements with the municipalities.7 To
a lesser extent the same story is repeated
in Mexico.8 Thus, the key difference in
explaining the different approaches to
central-local relations is between "federal"
and "unitary" nations. But even in the
federal cases, the issues currently facing
municipal governments are not essentially
different from those being faced by the
rest of the municipalities in the region. For
this reason, the report will not make a
point of identifying the different groups of
country experiences but instead we will
use a common framework for all countries,
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Decentralization in Latin America: Political and Territorial Organization (2007)
Country

Levels

Govt, levelnames

I

Intermediate

Local

Average

Average

Population in

of gov.

Level

Level

Population

Population

the largest

in urban

capita

I#)

(level 2)

(level 3)

Level2

Level 3

dty

agglomerations

(current USS)

(% of urban

>1million

population)

Population

(Xoftotal
population)

Argentina

3

federal, provincial,

24

2218

1,654,436

18,804

35

39

6645

9

32?

1,058,27?

29,126

26

32

1378

municipality/department
Bolivia*

4

national, department,
municipality/canton

Brazil

3

federal, state, municipal

2?

5564

7,041,481

34,169

12

39

7013

Chile

3

national, region, municipality

(15)

345

1,109,075

48,220

39

34

9851

Colombia

3

national, department,

32

1102

1,386,232

40,253

23

35

4684

national, canton

(?)

81

636,968

55,046

46

29

5891

Dominican Republic*"3

national, province, municipality

(32)

155

306,67?

63,314

32

22

4210

Ecuador

3

national, province, canton

22

221

606,446

60,370

29

32

3432

El Salvador

3

national, department,

(14)

262

436,19?

23,3 08

39

23

3336

(22)

333

606,989

40,101

16

8

2548

45

21

640

municipality
Costa Rica

3

municipality
Guatemala

3

national, department,
municipality

Haiti

3

national, department, commune

10

140

97,008

6,929

Honduras

3

national, department,

(18)

298

398,563

24,074

1671

191,128

4802

municipality
Jamaica

2

national, parish

Mexico

3

national, state, municipality

32

2454

3,290,016

42,902

Nicaragua

3

national, department,

(1?)

153

35,003

3,889

14

75

238,810

44,577

53

38

5828

14

23

34

9715
1023

municipality (+ 2 special regions)
Panama

3

national, province/comarca,
district

Paraguay

3

national, department, canton

17

231

360,390

26,989

51

30

1995

Peru*"

3

national, region/special

26

1834

1,096,480

15,544

39

28

3771

province, province/district
Trinidad and Tobago

2

national, region/borough/city

Uruguay****

2

national, department

16

83,013

16351

19

89

174,942

37,34?

49

45

729?

24

335

1,145,125

82,038

12

32

8299

[municipality)
Venezuela

3

national, state, municipality

Note: # computed using the number of jurisdictions in level. Between brackets when the authorities are not elected.
*

In Bolivia, there are departments, provinces (not elected authorities: 112), municipalities and territohes of traditional peoples "territorios indigenas
originarios campesinos" (incorporated in the new constitution)
**
In the Dominican Republic, recent constitution reforms recognize 229 municipal districts as local governments
*** In Peru, are two kinds of municipalities: provincials and districts.
**** in Uruguay, municipalities were created in 2009 by constitutional reform.
Sources: UCLG data collection, World Bank
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identifying particular country experiences
as lessons of what needs to be avoided or
what may be replicated.

density, little administrative capacity and
lacking an appropriate scale for the pro
vision of many basic public services.

The Structure of Local Governments

In many Latin American countries the
structure of local governments continues
to be work in progress. In the case of
Bolivia, the new 2009 Constitution
declares autonomous governments at the
regional,
municipal,
and
indigenous
community level, with the added facet that
indigenous communities may fit in one or
more municipalities or regions. The legal
norms regulating this structure have not
yet been enacted. The proliferation of new
local governments, almost always through
the fragmentation of existing ones,
continues to be quite common in the
region. For example in the Dominican
Republic, between 1995 and 2006 the
number of municipalities rose from 108 to
155.10

As a rule the vertical structure of govern
ment in Latin America is organized in three
tiers of government (Table 6.1), with the
exceptions of Bolivia that has four levels,
and Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago that
have two levels9. The focus of this paper
will be almost exclusively on the lowest
tier of government: the municipalities. The
intermediate levels (States, provinces,
regions and departments) will be referred
to only in issues relevant to the muni
cipalities.
As of 2010, there were over 16,000 mu
nicipal governments in Latin America.
Their number by country obviously varies
with population size and territory, with
Brazil counting 5,564 municipalities and at
the other extreme 16 municipalities for
Trinidad and Tobago. Local governments
vary considerably in size in each country
(Table 6.1).

9.

In the case of Bolivia,
the provincial level
may not be interpreted
as an additional
autonomous level.

10. A recent law in that
country has imposed
stricter requirements
for new potential
municipalities
requiring that they
have 15,000 residents
and be able to
generate at least 10
percent of the revenue
that their previous
municipality was
raising.

Even though a significant share of the
Latin American countries' population live
in the largest cities (for example, 53
percent in Panama, 49 percent in
Uruguay, 40 percent in Peru, and 35
percent in Argentina), the majority of
municipalities in the region remain, for
the most part, small in size and of a rural
nature. For example, in Peru over 200
municipalities have populations under
1,000 inhabitants, and over 50 percent of
all municipalities have fewer than 5,000
inhabitants. Thus the region faces
challenges at the two extremes: massive
metropolises
with
high
levels
of
population density, congestion and rings
of urban poverty; and very small
municipalities in rural areas with low

Local Expenditures and the Assignment
of Competencies

The scope of local government expen
ditures: The local government share in
total public expenditures and in GDP
differs significantly by country but they
are generally lower than those observed in
other regions of the world. However, as
shown in Figure 6.1, the share of the
public sector in GDP as measured by total
expenditures of the general government is
rather high, and at levels above those of
other countries in the world at similar
levels of per capita income. This contrast
of
proportionately
smaller
local
government sectors in otherwise larger
overall public sectors may be explained
first, by fewer functional expenditure
responsibilities being assigned to local
governments in comparison with other
regions of the world, and second, by
relatively lower levels of expenditure and
service provisions in those expenditure

Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy
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Local Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP and General Government

Sources: IMF, Ministries of Finance of Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru, UCLG data collection (cf. Annex 6.2)

responsibilities actually assigned to local
governments, as discussed below.
As shown in Figure 6.1, there are large
differences between the share of local
governments in total public expenditures
and the relative importance of local
government expenditures in GDP. Among
the most decentralized countries, as
measured by the municipal share in total
public expenditures are: Brazil, Ecuador,
and Colombia11 at around 20 percent,
followed by Peru and Bolivia at about 16
percent and Chile with 12.8 percent. Two
large federal countries, Argentina and
Mexico stand at 8.8 percent and 6.5 per
cent, respectively. At the low end we find
unitary countries that are still highly
centralized such as many Centro-American
and Caribbean countries (from 7 percent
in Salvador, to 1.7 percent in Panama
and 0.9 percent in Jamaica and between
them Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Guatemala, Costa Rica).

Perhaps a more meaningful measure of
local governments' role as providers of
public services is the share of local ex
penditures in overall GDP (Figure 6.1).
This variable measures the percentage of
national resources channelled through
local governments. From this perspective,
Brazil at 8.3 percent and Bolivia at 7.3
percent, Colombia at 5.6 percent (see
note 14) and Ecuador at 4.4 percent
are currently the most municipally
decentralized countries in the region,
while Argentina, Peru, Chile and Mexico
account for between 2 and 3 percent of the
GDP. At the bottom stand more centralized
countries:
Paraguay,
Honduras,
El
Salvador, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica,
Panama, Guatemala, and Jamaica, around
1 percent of GDP.
The assignment of expenditure compe
tencies: Several features characterize ex
penditure assignments in Latin American
countries. First, with the exception of
Argentina,12 all countries have explicit

11. For Colombia, if
departments as
intermediate local
governments are
added to the
municipalities, then in
2008 local
expenditures
represent as much as
29 percent of general
government
expenditure and 9.5
of GDP.
12. In Argentina, each
province regulates
the expenditure
responsibilities of
municipalities
differently. The
provinces, in general,
tend to enumerate a
set of general
functions
accompanied by a
clause that may be
used to expand local
competencies. Much
less frequently the
provinces explicitly
enumerate the
functions that
municipalities must
fulfill or functions
exclusively assigned
to them.

United Cities and Local Governments
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13. There are some qualified
exceptions to the rule.
For example, in the case
of Colombia there is no
special law assigning
expenditure
responsibilities at
different levels of
government, but there
are several laws (60 of
1993 and 715 of2001)
that specify certain norms
regarding the assignment
of competencies.
14. A clear exception to this
rule is Chile, where
municipalities are
circumscribed to a dosed
list of functions.
15. In El Salvador basic
education and primary
health are assigned to the
local level, but actual
service delivery works
through special local
mechanisms
administrated jointly by
the State, the
communities and the
private sector.
16. On the whole these
experiences appear to
have been positive
(Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico
and Peru). In the case of
Mexico some programs
have been critiqued
because of partisan
interference by central
authorities in the
deployment of funds.
17. Of significant importance
is that just a handful of
countries allow for the
taxation of both urban
and rural property. Those
countries allowing only
the taxation of urban
property leave rural
munidpalities in a
disadvantage. Note that
the property tax is still
assigned to the El
Salvador's central
government and that
there appears to be no
property tax in the
Dominican Republic, only
a property transfer tax.
18. A good example is the
"patente muniapaT'in
Chile which is paid
annually at rate based on
the dedared own capital
assets. This tax is further
discussed in the next
section.
19. In thecases of Brazil's
ISS (tax on services) and
Colombia's ICA (tax on
trade and industry),
munidpal collections
exceed those from the
property tax (IBI,
impuesto sobre bienes
inmuebles). The two
countries'experiences
with these taxes are also
further discussed in the
next section.

assignments for municipalities in their
national laws. In most countries, as shown
in Annex 6.1, the expenditure assignments
are defined in the country's constitution;
otherwise, the assignments are specified
in special laws, most commonly some form
of municipal code.13 Often, in these formal
assignments, municipalities are allowed to
provide any services not specifically
assigned
to
any
other
level
of
14
government.
Second, there are enormous variations in
the assignment of responsibilities to muni
cipalities; the assignments represent a
mosaic of approaches, which as shown in
Annex 6.1 defy generalization. Most coun
tries provide for a set of obligatory func
tions, often exclusively assigned to
municipalities. These range from basic
urban services such as garbage collection,
road maintenance, parks, market stalls
and slaughter houses, and so on, as well
as some administrative functions such as,
civil registry, land planning, and housing
permits. In addition, most countries
provide voluntary functions, which often
are co-shared with other levels of
government. These may include some
social services, such as basic education,
primary health services, and public
utilities, such as water and sewerage
services. But as can be seen in Annex 6.1,
in some countries (Colombia, Guatemala,
Jamaica) basic education and primary
health can also be designated as
obligatory and exclusive responsibilities of
local governments.15
Third, in some countries (for example,
Bolivia
and
Chile)
the
central
governments, while retaining the obligation
of financing social welfare services (such
as
social
security,
unemployment
compensation, and welfare payments),
have delegated the implementation and
management of several social programs

(e.g., family welfare services) to local
governments in order to exploit the
advantage of proximity and better information
local
governments
have.16 Municipal
governments in many Latin American countries
play a large role in the public investment
of infrastructure at the sub-national level
often as equal partners with upper level
governments in patterns similar to those
observed in European countries. For
example, in Brazil local governments in
recent years have undertaken close to 45
percent of all public sector investments.
Finally, many countries in Latin America
have concurrent or shared expenditure
responsibilities, which generally results in
less clarity and potentially more conflict
than exclusive assignments.
Revenue Assignments

Practically all countries of Latin America assign
certain taxes to local governments; some
exceptions are Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago. As shown in Table 6.2, the most
commonly assigned type is the property
tax, although it varies in name and scope
across countries.17 Other local taxes include
betterment levies, car registration and car
permits, real estate and land transfers, different
forms of business licenses,18 taxes on gambling,
and in some form of sales tax or business tax.19
Practically all local governments are allowed to
charge fees for particular public services such
as building licenses, refuse collection, public
utilities, slaughter houses, and public markets.
Revenue assignments are formalized in
different ways, usually in the general tax
laws or in special municipal laws. The
exceptions are Brazil, where it is established
in its national constitution, and Argentina
and Mexico, where the constitution
delegates to the provinces or states the
authority to determine local revenue
assignments. This arrangement results in
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Assignment of Taxes and Fees to Local Governments in Latin America
Type of Fees

Type of Tax
Country

Property

Others

Argentina

urban/rural property (and its increased value

car registration, turnover tax

public utilities, fines

because of public investment)"1
Bolivia

urban/rural property

car registration, car/property transfers,
slaughterhouse, construction

Brazil

fines, publicutilities

urban property (including increased value due

tax on service sector (ISS), registered goods

to infrastructure improvement)

tax, real estate transaction tax121

Chile

urban property

car registration, alcohol

public utilities, fines, permits

Colombia

urban property (and itsincreased value

surtax on gasoline, tax on industry/commerce,

public utilities, fines

because of public investment]

mineral extraction, slaughterhouse, gambling

Costa Rica

urban property

Ecuador

urban/rural (and its increased value because

public utilities

car tags, permits (business, construction),

fines, utilities

Specific taxes for each municipality based on

fines, public utilities, fees for services rendered

public infrastructure investment)
El Salvador

congress approval such as businesstaxes on
industrial, trade, and financial activities
Guatemala

urban property"1

tax on wages,advertising (banners),extraction of
products/economic activity, alcohol

Honduras

urban/rural property (and its increased value

tax on turnoverof industry and trade, extraction

because of public investment)

of natural resources (fishing, minerals, oil),

public utilities, firefighters, fines

slaughterhouses
Jamaica

Mexico

Parochial revenue fund

Urban property

Car registration (all other taxes are

Varies by state

centralized)
Nicaragua

Urban/Rural property

Sales tax (recently eliminated);patents and

fines, public utilities

business licenses
Panama

tax on unusedland (urban/rural)

tax on alcohol, economic activity and vehicles

fines, fees (cattle slaughter)

Paraguay

urban property (and its increased value

car registration, games/gambling, wealth tax

public utilities

because of public investment)

(corporate), land transfers/subdivision

United Cities and Local Governments

Assignment of Taxes and Fees to Local Governments in Latin America (cont.)
Type ofTax

I

Type of Fees

Countnj

Property

Others

Peru

urban/rural property

car registration, car transfer,

public utilities, fines

construction
Uruguay

urban property (and itsincreased value

car registration, gambling, shows

fines, fees for services

car tags, gambling, economic activity

fines, fees for services

because of public investment)
Venezuela

urban/rural property

Notes:
1. Argentina: Not all provinces have delegated property taxes to their municipalities
2. Brazil: The ISS is assessed and collected by the municipality at rates set by the municipality but subject to a maximum fixed by federal law
3. Tax collection authority is only given to local governments that prove to have the capacity to collect the tax

a variety of de facto assignments in those two
countries.20

20. In the case of Mexico,
the constitution assigns
only the real estate tax
to the municipalities.
21. In Argentina, some
provinces may also
allow their local
governments to
introduce new taxes
but under quite
restrictive guidelines.
22. <4s an exception, it
appears that in Bolivia
all local taxes are
collected and
administered by the
central authorities.

The level of autonomy granted to local
governments also varies. As summarized
in Table 6.3, most countries use a "closed
list" approach and do not allow the intro
duction of new taxes to local govern
ments; some exceptions include Ecuador
and Uruguay.21 On the other hand, about
two-thirds of the countries in the region
allow local governments the ability to set
the rates of some taxes; this practice is
widely accepted as the most desirable
form of tax autonomy that can be granted
to local governments. It is interesting
that countries such as Bolivia and Peru,
where decentralization reforms have
advanced rapidly in recent years, still
grant no discretion to set tax rates. A re
duced number of countries in the region
grant local discretion to modify tax base.
Most countries in the region allow local
government discretion in fixing the levels
of fees and user charges for local
government services. Nevertheless, an
important restriction on the revenue
autonomy of local governments is the

practice by several countries to require
local government revenue budgets ("plan
de arbitrios") to be previously approved
by a higher tier of government prior to
the start of the fiscal year. Table 6.3
shows this is still practiced in Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay; in
Mexico approval comes at the inter
mediate level from state governments. In
terms of fiscal administration (Table 6.3),
the general rule is local government is
responsible for the administration of local
taxes, fees and charges, although in some
cases, tax administration responsibility is
shared with the central authorities.22
In most countries in the region, the
yield from property tax remains far below
its potential (Figure 6.2). While on
average property taxes raise revenues
representing 2.12 percent of GDP in OECD
countries, 0.68 percent in transition
countries, and 0.60 percent in developing
countries, the average yield in Latin
America is only 0.37 percent of GDP.
The reasons for low performance are
multiple, including low political will from
national governments, local governments,
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Autonomy Granted in Revenue Assignments to Local Governments and
Responsibility for the Collection and Administration of Local Taxes and Fees
Country

Ability to

Ability to

Ability to

Control or vetoover

Responsibility for

introduce

set tax rates

change

local govt, budgets by

the collection of

new taxes

within legallimits

tax base

Central/Regional govt.

Argentina

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bolivia

No

No

Brazil

Yes

Chile

Fees

Taxes

No

L

L

No

Central

C/R

C

Yes

Yes

No

L

L

No

Yes

Yes

No

L

L

Colombia

No

Yes

No

No

L

C

Costa Rica

No

No

No

Central

PS*

PS*

Dominican Republic

No

No

No

No

C

c

Ecuador

Yes

Yes

No

No

L

L

El Salvador

Yes

Yes

No

No

L

L

Guatemala

No

Yes

No

No

L

01

Haiti

na

na

na

na

na

C

Honduras

No

Yes

No

No

L

L

Jamaica

No

Yes

Yes

Central

L

C/L

Mexico

No

No

No

Regional

L

L

Nicaragua

No

Yes

Yes

Central

L

L

Panama

No

Yes

No

Central

L

C/L

Paraguay

No

No

No

Central

L

C/L

Peru

No

No

No

No

L

L

Trinidad and Tobago

No

No

No

No

L

C/L

Uruguay

Yes

Yes

No

Central

L

L

Venezuela

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

L

L

Note *: Costa Rica collects, in some municipalities, through the private sector.
L= local, C= central, R=reglonal, PS= private sector

a
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Average Property Tax Revenue Raised as a Percentage of GDP
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23. For a discussion of the
issues, see Sepulveda
and Martinez-Vazquez
(2009) and De Cesare
and Lazo Marin (2008).
24. These two effects are
compatible if we recall
our discussion in the
previous section that
local government
budgets represent a
relatively small share
of the general
government budget.

Parliament and the disincentive effects of
revenue sharing and inter-governmental
fiscal transfers (IGFTs), not to mention
outdated
and poorly
equipped tax
administrations. These factors translate
into generous exemptions and low tax
rates, obsolete and infrequent property
value assessments, incomplete registries
and cadastres and a lack of willingness
and means to enforce collections. This
lacklustre performance varies little
with the different arrangements in the
region for discretion on rate setting or
administering property tax.23

Generally, the range of locally raised
revenues from own taxes and fees repre
sent a relatively small share of total consoli
dated revenues in the public sector,
although in terms of local budget shares,
these revenues are relatively large.24 Of
course there is a large variation in execution
from country to country. Figure 6.3 shows
that as percent of national GDP, local
governments in Brazil raise 8.2 percent,
Bolivia 7.7 percent, Colombia 5.2 percent.
Ecuador and Peru stay at 3.8 - 3.7 percent
followed by Guatemala and Chile 2.8 - 2.7
percent and then Argentina and Mexico 2.5
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2) Shares of Local Own Revenues (in percentages)
Own taxes andfees

Local own taxes

as * of local revenues

and fees as 1> of GDP

Argentina(2006]

49.8

1.2

Bolivia(2008)

11.4

27

Brazil(200?)

20.1

1.8

Chile(200?)

63.0

07

Colombia(2006)

41.2

2.1

Dominican Republic(2006]

58.4

07

Ecuador(200?)

34.6

1.6

El Salvador(200?J

13.2

0.3

Haitij 2004)

25.0

0.5

Honduras(2004)

11.1

0.2

Jamaica(2008]

100.0

0.2

Mexico(200?)

15.6

2.4

Nicaragua(2002)

44.0

0.6

Panama(2005)

49.0

0.3

Paraguay(2006)

34.1

1.2

Peru(2008)

43.2

2.6

Trinidad and Tobago( 1995)

52.9

0.1

Country (Most recent year)

Sources: UCLG data collection.

- 2.1 respectively. At the lower end stand El
Salvador, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Honduras,
and Jamaica (less than 2 percent).25
However, on average, municipalities raise
a higher percentage of their budgets from
their own revenues similar to Africa, Asia
and a good portion of European countries.
As shown in Table 6.4, the percentage of
local budgets financed out of their own
taxes and fees is quite high, at or above 25
percent for many countries.26 However, in
Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, and
Mexico the share is much lower in relation
to the other countries in the region.

Intergovernmental Transfers

As a result of limited fiscal autonomy,
practically all local governments suffer
from vertical imbalances, i.e. the expen
diture needs arising from their functional
competences exceed their ability to self
finance. Although the existence of vertical
imbalance is not in dispute, their actual
measure is generally a polemical issue
because practically no country in the re
gion has introduced explicit methodologies
to measure the expenditure needs of local
governments in a transparent and objec
tive manner. In order to address the exis

ts. See Annex 6.2 for the
breakdown of
revenues collected by
each tier of
government.
26. See Annex 6.3 in the
Appendix for the
breakdown of sources
for revenues of local
governments.

0
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ting vertical imbalances, practically all
countries in the region should implement a
range of fiscal transfers, often consisting
of different forms of revenue sharing, an
array of specific or conditional grants, and
in some cases, equalization grants.
In addition to vertical imbalances, in prac
tically all countries in the region there are
also significant horizontal imbalances
between local governments. These imba
lances are the result of the different tax
capacities and economic development of
local governments, and the different ex
penditure needs arising from disparities in
the service delivery costs and the differing
resident populations' needs arising from
their diverse characteristics. Horizontal
imbalances are most pronounced between
urban and rural municipalities and
between smaller and larger urban centers.
As we see later, different approaches are
used in the region to address these
horizontal imbalances.
The emphasis throughout the region has
been to address the problem of vertical
imbalances through different forms of
revenue sharing via central government
tax collections. There has been less
emphasis on the design of explicit equali
zation grants, although, quite often, reve
nue sharing formulas contain equalization
features. Conditional grants are less
common in Latin America than in other re
gions of the world, but here again there
are important exceptions.

27. In some cases, like in
Paraguay, the
allocation of funds is
still ad-hoc at the
discretion of the
central authorities.

Most countries in the region use some
form of general revenue sharing. The pool
of funds to be shared is most frequently
defined by total central government
revenues, although in some cases
particular taxes are excluded from the
pool. This is the case for Bolivia,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and

Nicaragua. In other cases, the pool is
based on specific central government
taxes; for example, 20 percent of oil
production fees derived by the Mexican
states must be passed on to their mu
nicipalities; Nicaragua's additional tax
sharing with municipalities is based on
revenues from natural resources; and in
Peru, some of the tax sharing is from
portions of the sales tax, and proceeds
from gas and oil extractions (canon,
sobrecanon, and canon petrolero). In the
latter, actual shared revenues are subject
to considerable market fluctuations, for
example, international price levels for
natural resources.
In some cases, shared revenues are
distributed on a derivation (i.e. origin)
basis, for example, the canon,
sobrecanon, and canon petrolero in Peru.
This approach (sharing revenues from
natural resources on a derivation basis)
has become a significant factor for
regional horizontal fiscal imbalances. Most
often some sort of formula is used for the
distribution of resources that includes
several variables, some of which, as noted
above, may have equalizing features.27 For
example, in Bolivia revenue sharing is
based solely on population; in Ecuador it
is according to population and relative
poverty levels; in El Salvador it is
according to population, "equity" (a fixed
amount for each municipality), poverty,
and land surface area; in Guatemala it is
distributed according to a formula that
includes equal shares (fixed amounts),
population, number of settlements, and
per capita income; in Honduras it is
according to population and equal
amounts for all municipalities; in
Nicaragua it is according to population and
several other criteria; and in Peru it is
according to population and infant
mortality rates. Frequently, the formulas
are also employed by central governments
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Composition of Local Government Revenue

Source: UCLG data collection, (cf. Annex 6.6)

to pursue several objectives other than
equalization. For example, in Ecuador the
sharing formula includes elements for
rewarding
administrative
effort
and
achieving
goals
in
the
national
development plan, while in Nicaragua the
formula provides incentives for increasing
revenues from property tax and for
achieving more effective budget execution.
Some countries allow unconditional use of
shared revenue, including Bolivia, Ecuador,
El Salvador, and Honduras. In other cases
the use of funds is conditional; Colombia
uses revenue sharing funds earmarked
for basic education, health, and water and
sewerage; Guatemala, for education, health
and infrastructure; while in Nicaragua and
Paraguay, a share of the funds -80 percent
in the latter case- must be spent on
infrastructure investment.

Revenue sharing practices in the federal
countries also have different features. In
Argentina, tax sharing with local govern
ments is carried out exclusively by the
provincial governments, which can decide
how to distribute their share of federal VAT
and income taxes. The Brazilian states also
have a tax sharing system funded with 25
percent of their regional VAT revenues,
which distributed 75 percent on a derivation
basis according to value added in the
municipalities, and 25 percent by a formula
based on population, land area, and other
variables. This same formula is used to
distribute federal tax sharing with the
states (cooperation funds) to the munici
palities. In Mexico, the states are required
to distribute to their municipalities at least
20 percent of the income that they receive
from revenue sharing in the federal funds
(Fondo de Fiscalizacion and Fondo General

United Cities and Local Governments

de participaciones). Mexico also has a
federal grant, amounting to 1 percent of
federal collections (Fondo de Fomento
Municipal) that is distributed on the basis
of municipal revenue collections.

28. Here we are referring
in a conventional way
to specific funds
assigned to particular
objectives and
administered
separately by central
government agencies.
This is interpreted as
being different from
the conditioning or
earmarking of revenue
sharing funds. As we
have seen above, a
number of countries in
the region condition
the use of revenue
sharing funds to
investment in
infrastructure and so
on. If the restrictions
in the use of revenue
sharing funds were
included in the general
category of conditional
transfers then the
practices in the
regions would not be
that different from
those in other regions
of the world.
29. This is a specific
instance of larger
developmental goals
that can be addressed
by conditional
transfers, such as arid
areas, poor areas,
unexploited high
potential areas, etc.

Conditional or specific transfers are less
extensively used in Latin American than in
other regions of the world,28 nevertheless
their use is increasing, especially in those
countries where central governments
count on being associated with local
governments as partners for the delivery
of certain services and the implementation
of national programs. For example, Bolivia
has introduced a conditional health trans
fer for a national program in support of
infants and mothers (seguro materno infantil). In Brazil, several conditional grants
have been introduced for public transport
(funded by the sharing of federal fuel
levies), basic education, and health
services, including hospitals from the
national health system. In Chile several
highly conditional grants have for many
years funded local governments' activities
in education, health, and other social
programs. Some conditional grants are
earmarked for certain geographical areas
that are deemed to be lagging behind. For
example, in Ecuador there is a conditional
capital investment grant for the Amazon
region.29
A particular subgroup of conditional grants
is earmarked for investment in local infra
structure. For example, El Salvador offers
grants for municipal capital infrastructure
based on the presentation of project
proposals. In Guatemala one-eighth of
VAT revenues go to infrastructure in social
and basic services, while a share of vehicle
taxes is earmarked for maintenance of
roads and drainage. In Mexico, at least 20
percent of the investment grants (Fondo
de Compensacion) from the federal
government must be assigned to the

poorest ten states in the country and used
by the municipalities of those states.
The practice of explicitly addressing hori
zontal disparities among local governments
through equalization transfers is still not
common but it is taking hold in the region.
One reason for the slow introduction of
explicit equalization grants is that often
revenue sharing schemes do incorporate
some equalization elements in their
allocation formulas. Several examples of
existing equalization grants (above and
beyond revenue sharing schemes with some
equalizing elements in their formulas) are
worth mentioning. One is Bolivia's HIPC
(Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative)
transfers started in 1997 with funds from
international organizations (the World Bank
and the IMF) that is distributed by the
central government to local governments
using a formula based on the poverty level
and population of municipalities. In Brazil,
there is a federal equalization transfer to the
municipalities funded with a share of federal
VAT and income tax revenues; the fund is
split into two parts, with 10 percent going to
state capital municipalities (distributed
according to population and the inverse of
per capita income) and the other 90 percent
to the rest of the municipalities (distributed
according to an index that favours munici
palities with smaller populations). An
interesting approach is that of Chile, where
the formula driven equalization grant (the
Common Municipal Fund) is funded by the
municipalities' own revenues from different
sources in what is known in the technical
parlance as a "fraternal" (or Robin Hood)
system, in which the relatively richer
municipalities finance the transferred
amounts to the poorer municipalities. The
allocation formula includes population size,
poverty levels, exempted real estate
property, and past revenue collections. One
key positive feature in all these examples is
the recognition of the need to introduce a
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Authority to Borrow by Local Governments in Latin America
Country

Access toFinancial Markets

Municipal Bank

Limitations

Argentina

Y

Y

Y

Bolivia

Y

NY

Brazil

Y

NY

Chile

N

N

n.a

Colombia

Y

n.a

Y

Costa Rica

Y

n.a

n.a

Dominican Republic

N

Y

Y

Ecuador

N

Y

Y

El Salvador

N

Y

Y

Guatemala

Y

n.a

Y

Haiti

n.a

n.a

n.a

Honduras

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Jamaica
Mexico

Y

N

Y

Nicaragua

Y

n.a

Y

Panama

n.a

n.a

n.a

Paraguay

Y

N

n.a

Peru

Y

N

Y

N

n.a

Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay

Y

N

Y

Venezuela

Y

Y

na

Source: UCLG data collection.

separate instrument (equalization grants) to
address the separate objective of horizontal
inequalities
arising
from
different
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.30 A
key common challenge ahead is the need to
improve the methodologies used to quantify
the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of
the different local governments.31
Borrowing

Given their expenditure responsibilities,
most municipalities have a
long-term
need to finance capital infrastructure.

Local borrowing can be considered a
legitimate, efficient, and equitable source
for financing this local infrastructure.
However, it is also widely accepted that
the local borrowing process must be
subject to explicit rules and limitations in
order to ensure fiscally responsible
behavior by local officials and to guarantee
macroeconomic stability in the country.32
Commonly applied rules include those
about expected behavior, such as the
"golden rule" that long-term borrowed
funds must be used for capital infra
structure only, and not for recurrent

30. The use of a fraternal
system to fund the
equalization transfers
in Chile is a promising
innovation. This is a
common system to a
number of European
countries but it is
uncertain how easily it
will be adopted by
other countries in the
region.
31. For the available
methodologies used in
other regions of the
world see, for
example, MartinezVazquez and Searle
(2007).
32. Historically this wasn't
always widely
accepted in some
countries in the region,
which in past decades
saw an accumulation
of macroeconomic
difficulties associated
with unfettered subnational borrowing in
some of the
federations and
politicized
govemment-run
municipal
development banks.
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expenditures, and different quantitative
budgetary limits on borrowing. Among the
latter, there are rules on non-negative
current budget balances, limits on the
level of total debt and debt-service
payments as a percent of budget
revenues, as well as restrictions on
borrowing abroad.

33. The exceptions include
Chile, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador,
Ecuador, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago.
34. For example, foreign
borrowing by the
municipalities in
Argentina requires
administrative
approval at the
provincial level and by
the Ministry of
Economy at the
national level, which it
has been argued has
been subject to
political criteria
beyond technical
aspects.
35. See Porto (2009).

For a variety of reasons, ranging from
fiscal conservatism to negative past expe
rience, not all countries in the world allow
their local governments to borrow. Yet in
the case of Latin America, as shown in
Table 6.5, most countries do allow local
governments to borrow.33 Practically all
countries allow such borrowing even
though they impose rules and limitations
on local borrowing similar to the
above-mentioned
international
"good
practice" guidelines. In most cases,
foreign borrowing is not allowed, in
some
cases
it
is
allowed
with
permission of the higher authorities, and
in other cases even domestic borrowing
requires administrative approval by higher
level authorities.34 Over time, national
systems have adapted to idiosyncrasies.
For example, in Nicaragua, municipalities
are able to contract short or medium term
loans from public and private banks for
public works, with long-term loans for
large-scale public works approved by the
National Assembly. Loans must be repaid
within the term of the elected officials;
mayors and municipal councils may not
leave debts to their successors, except for
long-term loans approved by the National
Assembly. In Colombia, law 358 from 1997
introduced a system of "semaforos"
(traffic light) restricting the level of local
debt according to the ability to pay by the
local units; if interest payments are below
40 percent of the operational surplus and
if the debt level is under 80 percent of
current revenues, local governments are
free to borrow according to the law;

however, they require permission from
the Ministry of Finance if any of those
limits is exceeded. With law 819, which
came into effect in 2003, the need to have
a primary surplus sufficient to cover on
going debt service was added to the
existing indicators. The three indicators
must be positive in every year of the loan,
and this must be reflected in the medium
term fiscal framework of the municipality
or department. In El Salvador, munici
palities can borrow from commercial banks
once they receive the proper quality
ranking from the Ministry of Finance and
the semi-official organization charged with
the physical distribution of the general
transfer funds. The municipalities then
establish an intercept agreement for those
transfers to work as collateral for the loans
from the commercial banks. As in other
countries around the world, it is common
to impose limits on annual debt service as
percent of revenues (for example 20
percent in Argentina and Bolivia or 40
percent in Ecuador) and/or the total stock
of debt as percent of total revenues (120
percent in Brazil or under 100 percent in
Ecuador and Peru).
The actual amount of sub-national debt,
which includes local and provincial/state
debt, is quite low in most countries, with
the exception of Brazil and Argentina,
where sub-national debt represents in
recent times between 10 and 15 percent
of GDP; Mexico, Colombia and Bolivia
come behind with sub-national govern
ment debt representing less than 2 per
cent of GDP as of 2007. However, for
municipal governments alone in recent
years, Bolivia is first in debt service
(interest and repayment of principal) at
around 9 percent of total municipal
expenditures, followed by Ecuador at
around 8 percent, and Argentinean and
Brazilian municipalities, where debt service
stands at around 4 percent.35
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Budgeting

The budgeting process at the local level in
most Latin American countries is still carried
out along traditional lines with heavy
emphasis on incremental budgeting and
ex-ante financial audit controls for the
disbursement of funds. Much less attention
is given to the planning of expenditure
programs and ex-post evaluation of the
effectiveness of funds disbursed on
programmatic goals.36 One positive aspect
without exception is, local budgets need to
be approved by democratically elected local
councils. However, as we have seen above,
in a significant number of countries (Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama,
Paraguay)
at
least
some
components of the local budgets need to be
approved ex-ante by higher level authorities
at the central or regional levels. It is
questionable
whether
or
not
these
approvals are really needed; the best
practice internationally is to rely on
horizontal accountability mechanisms
ex-ante, and on the ex-post audit and to
grant full budgetary autonomy to local
governments.37
"Participatory budgeting" is an area of
innovation in the region that has attracted
much international attention. The specific
meaning of this term varies among countries
introducing this type of reform, but generally
means additional mechanisms for citizens to
influence local budgetary decisions beyond
the conventional vehicle of democratic
elections for municipal councilors.38 For
example,
in
Bolivia
a
1994
law
established citizen committees (comites de
vigilancia) and community-based organizations
(OTBs—organizaciones de base), that are
social organizations of peasant communities,
the indigenous population, and neighborhood
groups. Citizen participation at the local level
is also important in Brazil, but varies
considerably across states and municipalities.

One experiment involves groups of citizens
empowered to address social and
political inequalities by influencing the
allocation of budget resources through
neighbourhood meetings.39 Even some
provinces in Argentina, have formally
adopted participatory budgeting.40 On the
other hand, participatory budgeting is
generally appropriate for only certain
elements of the budget; thus, even in Porto
Alegre (Brazil) the share of the budget
subject to this process is limited (see Box
6.6). Nevertheless, the implementation of
participative budgeting often depends on
the will of the Mayor and the City Council
since it is not a compulsory or permanent
tool.
As for the composition of municipal
budgets, our discussion is based on a
small number of countries where data
availability varies. In terms of the econo
mic classification of local expenditures,
the high share of capital infrastructure ex
penditures in the municipal budgets of a
significant number of countries is notable
(Figure 6.5). For example, in both Chile
and Ecuador, local governments spend 55
percent of their budgets on capital
expenditures; in Guatemala this figure is
64 percent and in Peru, 58 percent. Of
course, there are large variations for these
figures across countries, including the
assignment of expenditure responsibi
lities—what tier of government is respon
sible for capital infrastructure in the
different areas of responsibility: schools,
roads, etc -and the legal restrictions
imposed on local governments for how to
spend revenue sharing and other types of
funds— as in Peru, where local govern
ments only can spend funds from the
canon and sobrecanon from natural
resources on capital investments. There is
also the possibility that capital expen
ditures are over reported.41 Whatever the
explanation, it is clear that many local

36. The strong emphasis
on ex-ante treasury
controls has not, on the
other hand, reduced
corruption, which, with
some exceptions, still
appears to be extensive
among local
governments (and the
rest of the public
sector) in the region.
The difficulbes lie more
in poor execubon of the
ex-ante controls than in
a deficient design.
37. In some cases controls
for checking the legality
of actions, as opposed
to changing budget
allocabon decisions,
can be justified when
horizontal
accountability and audit
mechanisms are
deficient or not present
at all.
38. Somewhat related,
citizen participation
mechanisms such as
referendums, "popular
initiatives," and elected
representative recalls
have been operating in
other regions of the
world.
39. See Afonso (2006).
40. For a positive
assessment in the case
of Bolivia, see Faguet
(2004). See also
Goldfrank (2006) and
Shah (2007) for
general assessments.
41. There are incentives in
many countries in the
region to report some
current expenditure as
capital expenditure. For
example, in some cases
central legislation
restricts the share of
budgets that can go to
recurrent purposes. In
other cases, practically
all kinds of current
expenditures have
been demonized as
being inefficient so local
authorities actually
report some current
expenditure as actually
being some form of
capital expenditure.
But, fortunately there
does not appear to be a
problem in Latin
America with the offbudget programs and
expenditures that are
common in other
regions of the world, for
example Africa and
Asia.

United Cities and Local Governments

Budget Expenditure by Economic Classification of Local Governments

100%
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I
Current Expenditure

•Capital Expenditure/Debt/Equipment

Source: UCLG data collection (cf. Annex 6.4)

governments in Latin America have been
given an important role to play in the task
of providing much needed infrastructure.
This highlights the importance of finding
more stable and potent instruments for
infrastructure finance.
As we have seen, the movement toward
open and participatory budgeting is
spreading, increasing budget efficiency and
accountability in general. Although parti
cipatory budgeting is not directly about
decentralization
itself, the
movement
toward participatory budgeting has tended
to reinforce decentralized institutions. There
are, however, exceptions; for example, in
the Dominican Republic, Law 176 of 2007
goes a long way to introduce participatory
budgeting but the actual level of decentra
lization to local governments in that country
remains quite weak.

Even less data are available to obtain a
panoramic
view
of
the
functional
classification of local budgets in the
region; for countries where individual
municipalities'
data
are
available,
comparisons are hard because of the
different classification methods used in
each country. As shown in Figure 6.6,
education expenditures, deriving from the
assignment of expenditure competencies,
are important items in the local budgets of
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. For the
same reason, expenditures on health
services are relatively important in the
local budgets of Brazil, Colombia, and
Peru, with budget shares here ranging
between 16 and 22 percent. It is note
worthy that in most of these countries for
which disaggregated data are available,
not surprisingly "general administration" is
the most important expenditure item in
terms of budget shares.
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Shares of Local Government Expenditure by Functional Classification

Source: UCLG data collection (cf. Annex 6.5)

Special Issues, Constraints and
Opportunities for Local
and Intergovernmental Finance
in the Region
As shown in the introductory section, the
Latin American region offers a vast array
of different experiences and approaches to
local finance. The kinds of issues facing
local governments in large federal countries
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are
often very different from those affecting
local governments in small countries such
as El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Paraguay.
Furthermore, there is also significant di
versity among the large federal countries
as well as among the unitary countries.
Hence, the attempt to generalize analysis
of local problems and their solutions is
neither always possible nor desirable.
Nevertheless, some themes common to a
significant number of countries in the re
gion clearly emerge from the description

of the local finance system presented in
Section 1. In this section we identify some
of the special issues, constraints and
opportunities for the development of local
finance in Latin America. It is organized
around four major themes: (a) Or
ganizational Structure; (b) Intergovern
mental Fiscal System Design; (c) Budget
Process and Transparency; and (d) Short
Term and Long Term Structural Challenges.
Issues on Organizational Structure
Fragmentation and sub-optimal scale42

In many countries there is an ongoing
debate on the number and size of local
governments related to the issues of
economies of scales to deliver public
services, which typically improve with size,
and citizen representation, which generally
deteriorates with size. Citizens that feel
marginalized frequently call for the

42. The issues of local
fragmentation and
administrative
capacity have a
significant political
component and from
that perspective they
were reviewed in
GOLD I. Our main
perspective here is on
how fragmentation
and administrative
capacity may affect
the fiscal sustainability
of local governments.
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43. For example, in El
Salvador, the Fund for
Economic and Social
Development (FODES),
which is the main source
of local revenues, is
distributed according to a
formula that distributes
25 percent of the funds
evenly to all
municipalities.
44. However, these
programs can be difficult
to implement. For
example, in El Salvador,
the National Plan for
Territorial Development
and Organization
(PNODT) was supposed
to promote mancomunidades and general
cooperation among local
governments which
would allow them to
lower administrative
costs by working
together to print jointly
needed forms and
gathering regularly to
share ideas. However,
the results are very
limited.
45. Other approaches to
dealing with the problem
of inadequate scale
include the contracting
out to private companies
of some services, so that
private companies can
benefit from sufficient
scale by supplying
different municipalities,
or the creation of 'sector
specific'service govern
ments or districts. The
privatization of services is
being used in several
Latin American countries.
See Martinez-Vazquez
and Gomez (2008) for a
discussion of the issues
and solutions.
46. See Martinez-Vazquez
and Gomez (2008) and
Imansyah and MartinezVazquez (2009) for a
more extensive dis
cussion of this issue.
47. The latin America region
shows a lower prevalence
for Ministries of Local
Government/Inte
rior/Home Affairs that are
more prevalent in other
regions of the world and
have a higher presence
of specialagencies
designed to exclusively
address the needs of
local governments, such
as ISEDM y F1SDL in El
Salvador or INIFOM in
Nicaragua. In general, it
is easier for these types
of specialized agencies to
play a supporting and
capacity development
role than it is for sectoral
ministries; the downside
is that the specialized
agencies tend to pull a
lower rank within the
government
administrations in the
bargain for additional
resources.

creation of new municipalities. As the current
legal frameworks guarantee a minimum
amount of funds to each municipality
regardless of size, this has promoted the
creation of new municipalities.43 In response
to this problem some countries have
introduced legislation requiring minimum
population size in order to ensure the future
fiscal viability of any new local government.
This action can be effective in slowing down
the process of further fragmentation but it
does not help to address the inadequate
scale of the already existing municipalities.
Perhaps a more attractive and potentially
equally effective approach is the promotion
and creation of associations of municipali
ties into mancomunidades for the delivery
of certain public services requiring certain
minimum scale.44 This is an approach still
largely unexploited but it is currently being
developed in some countries, especially in
some provinces of Argentina, southern
Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru.45
The trade-off between economies of scale
and representation46

The issue of an optimal scale of local
governments presents an inherent tradeoff
between the (potential) better political
connection in terms of representation and
accountability of smaller jurisdictions with
the (potential) greater fiscal viability of
larger jurisdictions (in particular with regard
to population size).

services may be offset by greater efficiency
in responding to the needs and preferences
of local residents.
Local administrative capacity

The problem with local governments'
administrative capacity is closely
associated with their small size (in number of
inhabitants). Central governments (or state
or provincial governments in the case of
federal countries) spend little time and
resources
in developing the capacity of
local governments.47 Some of the slack has
been taken up by local government
associations, which, for example in some of
the Andean countries and in Central America,
provide their members with assistance and
training. However, these associations often
lack the resources necessary to address this
issue.
Central
(or
provincial-state)
governments can do much more.
To summarize, there are no exact answers
or methodologies to address the issue of
optimal size for municipalities. Several
goals need to be pursued including cost
efficiency
and
representation
and
accountability and several constraints
need to be met regarding fiscal viability
and administrative capacity. See Box 6.1.
Issues on Intergovernmental Fiscal
System Design
Lack of clarity in the assignment of
expenditure responsibilities to local

The essence of this trade-off between the
greater efficiency of smaller governments
that can better match the preferences and
needs of local residents in their expenditure
allocation and economies of scale in
production with lower costs associated
with larger governments implies a
compromise solution between the two
objectives. In particular, it implies that lower
cost effectiveness in the delivery of public

governments

One of the weakest points of many
decentralization programs in Latin America
has been the scant attention given to clear
assignment of expenditure responsibilities
of sub-national governments, which is a
crucial first step in the design of any
system
of
intergovernmental
fiscal
relations. Instead, the focus has been
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Box 6.1. Four Possible Criteria to Consider for the Minimum Size of Municipalities
Although the desirable minimum size of municipalities is a complex issue that must be
addressed in the historical and political contexts of each country, there are four basic
criteria that can be followed as guideline for policy decisions:
(1) The production/cost efficiency/population criterion. The international experience
shows that unit costs for some public services (such as water or public transportation)
can be much affected by scale. Depending on the assignment of expenditure
responsibilities, in order to arrive at the lowest cost of production it is required to reach
a minimum size in terms of population. Yet we must note that there are other ways to
provide services in a cost efficient manner, including buying the services from a larger
local government, creating an association between several smaller local governments to
produce the service, or even buying the services from a large privatized producer. What
this means is that this criterion of a minimum population size should be administered
intelligently with flexibility to allow for these other service delivery possibilities.
(2) The representation/political responsiveness/accountability criterion. The general
presumption is that smaller local governments will generally tend to be more
representative and accountable to the residing population. But consideration must also
be given to the fractionalization of the population and adequate representation of the
minority groups' interest. Population density should also be considered. From an
accountability and representative focus it would seem that a simple but useful rule of
thumb will be the time required to travel to the location of the municipality building.
(3) The financial/fiscal capacity criterion. It seems reasonable to require that any new
local government have a minimum level of economic capacity to self finance some of its
service needs. Measuring this capacity is not always an easy matter, but it should
involve some approximation to the "expenditure needs" and the "fiscal capacity" of each
potential municipality and the setting of some threshold for the difference between
needs and capacity.
(4) The administrative capacity criterion. This can be measured in a number of different
ways, but fundamentally qualified personnel available to run the business of the local
government efficiently is required.

almost exclusively on putting in place some
form of financing scheme.48 At present,
there continues to be too much emphasis
in many countries of the region on the
decentralization
processes
simply
understood "as the provision of some of
revenue sharing and transfers" to local
governments, ignoring the fundamental rule
that "finance should follow function."

On closer analysis, the assignment of
functional responsibilities remains in many
cases too general and vague. For example
in El Salvador, the municipal code gives
authority to municipalities to perform a list
of responsibilities that clearly overlap with
those
also
assigned
to
central
government; the same is true in Uruguay.
In other cases, the vagueness lies in the

48. See Bahl and MartinezVazquez (2006) for a
discussion of the proper
sequencing of
decentralization
reforms.
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way that legislation is implemented (or not
implemented). For example, Law 66 of
1997 in the Dominican Republic added
primary and secondary education to the
responsibilities of local governments; yet
real power and decision-making remain
with the regional Education and Culture
committees, which may be considered a
deconcentrated
tier
of
the
central
49
government.
Beyond the operational inefficiencies
associated with the unclear assignments
of functions, an important consequence is
the ambiguity in political accountability
this situation introduces. The governance
implications for attaining the purported
benefits of decentralization are quite
considerable.

49. Although the trend in
the region has been
toward more
devolution of
responsibilities to local
governments, there
are exceptions. For
example, Jamaica has
been recentralizing
functions previously
assigned to the local
governments (Parish
Councils) through the
creation of national
entities under the
tutelage of the Ministry
of Local Government,
which is in charge of
fire protection
services, parks and
markets.
50. See, for example, the
discussion in Porto
(2009).

Another problem is that the assignment of
expenditure responsibilities in practically
all Latin American countries is uniform for
all local governments, regardless of their
size and administrative capacity. As
aforementioned, a good way to address
these shortcomings is the creation of
associations of local governments into
mancomunidades.
Alternatively,
there
may be room for asymmetric assignments
for municipalities of different size and
administrative capacity.
Nevertheless, the highly asymmetric
assignment of expenditure responsibilities
can lead to confusion. For example, in
Ecuador, the Constitution (Article 226)
establishes the obligation of central
government to transfer functional compe
tencies at the discretion (by voluntary
request) of sub-national governments.
This
means
that
any
sub-national
government can request a full or partial
competence in a particular area at their
discretion, leading to great heterogeneity
in central-local relations, thereby compro
mising the overall effectiveness of inter

governmental coordination. A better
practice could be to design two or at most
three different packages of expenditure
responsibilities that can be devolved to
local governments depending on their
administrative capacity. However, an
important
issue
with
asymmetric
approaches is the need for using verifiable
criteria, that is, differential assignments
must be grounded in something other than
political connections.
Another factor contributing to confusion in
the assignment of expenditure res
ponsibilities is the common practice of
unfunded mandates. Frequently, line mi
nistries may partially decentralize certain
competencies to local governments with
out providing the required resources to
implement them properly. There may also
be increased reporting requirements on
local governments without adequate
coordination among central government
agencies or the provision of the technical
and financial means to make that
reporting possible.
A workable system of expenditure assign
ments, no matter how specific, is develo
ped in the laws and regulations, which
always requires coordination and effective
dialog between the different levels of
governments. Because of the larger num
ber of municipalities, it is important that
the voice of these local governments be
represented by associations of municipali
ties. On this front there has been consider
able
progress
since
practically
all
countries in the region have developed
effective municipal associations.50 How
ever, central authorities have not always
recognized these associations as strategic
partners in improving policy design in
expenditure
assignments
and
the
strengthening of other components of the
fiscal decentralization systems.
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One final issue in the practice of expen
diture assignments is the practically uni
versal lack of effective and transparent
methodologies to translate the assignment
of functional responsibilities into expendi
ture needs. Sometimes, historical costs
(or levels of expenditures prior to decen
tralization) are used as a guide. Different
methodologies are used in other countries
around the world, such as the use per-client
spending norms or bottom-up cost
estimates that could be successfully
implemented in the region. The advantage
of having some effective method to
calculate expenditure needs is that the
discussions on and ultimate design of
revenue assignments, whether through
own revenue or fiscal transfers, becomes
more informed and rational.
Insufficient revenue autonomy

The level of tax revenue autonomy of local
governments differs quite significantly
across Latin American countries. Countries
such as Brazil and Chile have relatively
high autonomy and countries such as El
Salvador, Mexico and Peru have signi
ficantly less. But, in general, as it occurs in
some other regions of the world (Africa,
Asia and many European countries), local
revenue autonomy in Latin America re
mains below what is desirable.
The lion's share of financing for local
governments in the region continues to
come from different forms of central
government transfers including revenue
sharing. Transfers have experienced an
increase as the most often used form of
newly devolved financing responsibility for
local governments. With this in mind,
some important and correct policies have
been adopted for various countries in the
region. For example, many countries in
Latin America have taken steps to increase
their share of own taxes in local budgets.

Most have now assigned the property tax
to the local level, which is excellent
because there are many features that
make it an ideal tax.51 Unfortunately, the
property tax remains highly underutilized
for a variety of reasons.52 Several other
taxes have been assigned to local
governments,
including
vehicle
tax,
betterment levies, and different forms of
business taxes and licenses. These
positive measures should be imitated by
countries that still allow little local tax
autonomy. Another practice to emulate is
the allowance of a certain degree of
discretion for municipalities to set the
rates of their local taxes, between some
maximum and minimum approved levels.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to make a
strong case for policy design that allows
for a greater degree of tax autonomy
when there is a perception that many local
governments in the region do not make
effective use of the tax autonomy law
granted to them. This is most clear in the
case of the property tax for which actual
revenues collected are a small fraction of
the revenue potential.53 So the realization
of more revenue autonomy for local
governments may need to be accompanied
by a significant improvement in local tax
effort. However, it is important to note
that low tax effort (known in the region as
"pereza fiscal") is a complex problem. First,
there is often confusion between low tax
effort ("pereza fiscal") and low tax capacity
or economic/fiscal poverty of jurisdictions.
Establishing the presence of "pereza fiscal"
requires a comparison between actual
tax collections and potential tax collections
of every particular jurisdiction; this is a
complex task in many cases. Second, once
the presence of "pereza fiscal" can be
established, it is important to understand
its multiple roots, from simple political
economy issues (local officials may simply
be happy spending funds but never raising

51. The property tax is
highly visible and
because of the low
geographical mobility
of its base and
because property
values tend to reflect
well in general the
quality of local
services, the property
tax can approximate
well the concept of a
benefit tax, where
residents pay for the
services they receive
(see Sepulveda and
Martinez-Vazquez,
2009). All of this is
likely to increase
political accountability
of local officials. The
property tax may also
have relatively low
efficiency losses
compared to other
local taxes. In terms of
administration, there
can be flexibility in
taking advantage of a
mixed local and central
administration and
enforcement
approaches See Bahl,
Martinez-Vazquez and
Youngman (2008 and

2010).
52. See Sepulveda and
Martinez-Vazquez
(2009) for an
evaluation of the
performance of
property taxes in the
region.
53. See Sepulveda and
Martinez-Vazquez
(2009).

m
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Box 6.2. A Tale of Two Cities: Bogota's Success Story in Raising Local Tax
Effort and Lima's Success with a New Approach to Tax Administration
Bogota provides an example of a local government that has had success in raising local
tax effort (the city was awarded a prize by the United Nations in 2002 for being the most
improved local government in the world.) Starting in the late 1980s, The Municipality of
Bogota began a program of civic education during which it emphasized the importance
of paying taxes and the accompanying benefit for citizens that derives from a stronger
local government. It significantly increased property tax collections through a series of
administrative improvements, including enforced business taxes, privatizing certain
government run organizations, and successfully issuing own bonds, some times in
foreign markets receiving a AAA rating,54 Particularly noteworthy is that the Municipality
of Bogota in 2006 raised 42 percent of its tax revenues from the local business tax
(Impuesto de Industria y Comercio, ICA). Updating the fiscal cadastre in 2009 has also
produced significant increases in revenues from the property tax. It is expected that the
assessed tax base for this levy will increase by more than 50 percent by 2010, bringing
an additional $51 million in revenues or a 13.3 percent increase over collections before
the updating of the cadastre.
In 1996 Lima, along with other provincial Peruvian municipalities, introduced a semiautonomous Tax Administration Service (SAT in Spanish), with the goal of increasing
collections for own local taxes. This followed the model of a national-level SAT. The SAT
of Lima is autonomous in its financial and human resource management and it is
financed through a share of the taxes and fees commission it collects. The shared
collections by Peruvian municipalities range from 3 percent to 10 percent. But note that
the local authorities are still responsible for regulating and controlling the SATs' work.
There have been some clear benefits for those Peruvian municipalities that, like Lima,
adopted a SAT approach. For example, between 1998 and 2007 those municipalities
that adopted a SAT increased their own revenue by 80.9 percent, or 9 percent of the
annual average, by comparison over the same period the municipalities that did not
adopt a SAT saw their revenues increase by 61.2 percent, or 6.8 percent of the annual
average. The empirical studies show that the trust in tax administration in Lima and
other municipalities where a SAT was adopted has increased. This could be attributed to
lower political intervention in administrative processes, higher client focus
management, improved public relations, and a reduction of corrupt practices. But not all
have been highly regarded for their new local tax administration. The same empirical
survey studies identify some issues associated with the SATs: such as a limited link
between the revenue collection and public services, and the public perception of tax
administration as "insensible." But some of this is to be expected since the SATs have
gone against the conventions and took advantage of not always well defined rules,
especially in the SAT of Lima. One of the key characteristics of the SAT agencies has
been their innovative drive, including internal processes, the use of modern
technologies, human resource development, improved financial management, and the
collaboration across tax administrations.
54. See Acosta
and Bird (2005).
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them), to lack of economic resources
(building an updated fiscal cadastre is
expensive), to inadequate methodologies
for evaluation, to the lack of skilled human
resources, or even to the negative in
centives for local tax effort provided by the
central
government's
existing
fiscal
transfer system. However, the region
offers success stories in raising local tax
effort, as provided by the recent expe
riences of Bogota and Lima (see Box 6.2).
A third issue is the need to explore taxes
with significant revenue potential that
could possibly be assigned to local
governments in order to increase their
revenue self-sufficiency, akin to a flat-rate
piggy back personal income tax or local
surtaxes on some excise duties, such as
those on vehicle fuel. Another possibility is

a more intense use of betterment levies,
which can complement annual real pro
perty taxes. Betterment levies are being
used quite successfully in Colombia (See
Box 6.3). A different option is the adoption
of some form of final retail tax such as in
the case of Brazil's ISS (Tax on Services,
as discussed in Box 6.4.) Except that this
type of tax, although fine within the
Brazilian tax system where the federal and
state VAT levies exclude many important
services from their bases, may be
problematic because it would overlap with
other countries' existing VATs.55
An alternative to the ISS that would not
present potential conflicts with the
existing national VATs, is the broader base
local business tax (Impuesto de Industria
y Comercio, ICA) in Colombia. This is a

Box 6.3. Betterment Levies ("Contribucion de Valorizacion") in Colombia
In general terms, a betterment tax recoups some of the benefits accrued by property
owners due to adjacent public investment that increases the value of that property
(Bird & Slack 2006). Since most real estate property is significantly affected by
public facilities surrounding it, this tax has significant revenue potential. In
Colombia, this tax receives the name Contribucion de Valorizacion and it has been in
operation for a long time. The constitution gives municipalities and other public
entities the right to a share on the added value produced by investments made in
urban settings (e.g. infrastructure works). The tax is being looked at with interest by
other countries and in the first Latin American conference of Valorization, held in
Bogota (Colombia) in 2009.56 The levying of the tax implies a series of steps
including, the determination of the costs and benefits of the project, the
geographical area that is expected to benefit, and a method to distribute the costs
and benefits of the project among the different properties. This distribution can use
an array of "benefit factors" (use of property, closeness, access, etc.) or simply a
land area, linear size of lot front, etc.
Bogota also levies a tax called Participation en Plusvalia57 defined as the contribution
owed to owners of real estate property as a result of modifications that increase the
value of property. This is similar to the betterment tax except that it captures only
changes in urban codes that affect the ways the property can be used or the intensity of
its use (how much can be constructed) that may increase its value.

55. For example, in the
recent past Nicaragua
eliminated a
productive local sales
tax as part of a policy
conditionality given by
the International
Monetary Fund
precisely because of
the conflict presented
by the existing
national VAT.
56. I Congreso
Latinoamericano de
Valorizacion;
http://www. lonjadebo
gota. org.co/Portals/0/
Docs/
57. Information about this
tax may be found at:
http://www. shd. gov.c
o/portal/page/portal/p
ortal_internet/impuest
os/impuestos_ imp/Plu
s vaiia/INFO%20PL US
VAUA

United Cities and Local Governments

Box 6.4. The ISS in Brazil58
The ISS (Imposto sobre Servicos/Tax on Services) is a municipal level tax levied on
those services that are left out of Brazil's state value added tax (ICMS). The services
that may be taxed under ISS are defined by federal law, but the states may decide
whether to tax or exempt some of those services. The base covers a wide range of
services including, IT services, rental of premises, medical services, veterinary services,
personal services (barber shops, etc), professional services (engineering, architecture,
law, accounting, etc.), education and training, hotels and tourism, parking, leisure
entertainment (movies, shows), repair services, financial services (by banks, etc.),
municipal transportation, port, terminal, and airport services. The tax base is the
revenue generated from the provision of services. The rate that municipalities may
charge for ISS is locally set but cannot exceed 5 percent (in the past, it could go as high
as 10 percent). Although the tax rate to be applied is the one charged by the
municipality in which the business resides, there are exceptions in which the tax rate is
the one belonging to the municipality where the service is rendered (e.g. construction).
Producers of services are charged with paying and recordkeeping of the ISS. Buyers of
services do not directly see the tax they pay as it is included in the price charged to
them by vendors.
Although the ISS collects at the municipal level, its importance varies greatly across
local governments; according to the Receita Federal (national tax administration) 1
percent of municipalities (out of more than 5,500) account for 73 percent of the tax
collection. The ISS collected approximately 0.5 percent of the GDP in the mid-to-late
1990s and more recently, the tax collections are nearer to 0.8 percent of the GDP. As
the maximum tax rates were lowered sometime in the early 2000s, the observed
increase in collections as a share of GDP might come either from an expanded tax
base and/or better efforts in collecting the tax. There is some evidence of the
expansion of the tax base; when the rates were lowered in 2003. The ISS was also
extended to services provided by financial institutions, banking services in particular.
The ISS is not without its problems. One issue is the increased tax on the production of
products/services for future use, since users of these services cannot identify the ISS
balance to be paid against the ISS they would receive; remembering that the price for
the services are ISS inclusive. Another issue has been the management of exports. The
import of services is subject to this tax, and although it should not apply to exported
services, it may become subjected to this tax.59

58. See, among others,
Deloitte (2010),
Government of Brazil
(2009), KPMG (2006),
Banco Central do
Brasil (2000) and
Purohit (1997).
59. See KPMG (2006).

With regard to the future of the ISS, there have recently been calls in Brazil for the
simplification of the tax system where-one way or another- the elimination of the ISS
was contemplated. This viewpoint supports the integration of the federal-based IPI and
state-based ICMS (both value-added type taxes) and the locally-based ISS within a
general VAT whose revenues could be shared by all three levels of government.
However, the increasing importance of ISS in municipal budgets, with regard to the
potential loss in local autonomy and the difficulties of coordination at different levels of
government, weigh-in on the other side of the argument.
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local "direct" tax on all business activities
(industry, trade and services) that uses as
its presumptive tax base the monetary
value of annual transactions. It is also
levied at different rates depending on the
sector. The production of food pays a rate
of 0.41 percent, the sales of alcoholic
beverages, tobacco products, and fuels
pay a rate of 1.38 percent, and financial
transactions pay a rate of 1.1 percent. The
ICA is one of the most important sources
of municipal tax revenues in Colombia, on
average representing approximately 42
percent of municipalities' annual tax
revenues, but as much as 72 percent in
the Municipality of Cali.
Another form of local business tax with
revenue potential is Chile's "patente mu
nicipal." This annual levy, administered
by the municipalities, is paid for any com
mercial activity (trade, professional,
industrial,
and
sale
of
alcoholic
beverages) that requires a permanent
office location; municipalities select rates
between 0.25 and 0.5 percent that fall on
the declared (to the national tax
administration) own capital of the
business. The "patente municipal" raises
approximately the same amount of
municipal revenues in Chile as the
property tax ("impuesto territorial.")
In terms of revenue collection hierarchy in
Latin America, the two sets of taxes that
are generally of equal importance are the
property taxes (impuesto sobre los bienes
inmuebles, IBI) and the different taxes on
business activities and services. In a
distant third place we find those taxes
falling on the use of motor vehicles.
Generally, there would appear to be room
to increase local revenues for taxes on
motor vehicles. This is also the case for
local fees and charges in many countries in
the region; often the levels of fees and
charges are completely out of date.60

Unbundling revenue sharing

Revenue sharing is the most common
mechanism for arranging fiscal transfers
to sub-national governments in Latin
America and in many countries provisions
for revenue sharing are enshrined in the
constitution. As mentioned in Section 1,
fiscal decentralization has often been
understood simply as the sharing of
central government revenues without
relating the additional revenue to any
particular local and regional expenditure
assignments.
One of the most negative aspects of
revenue sharing in other parts of the
world is that it can exacerbate the subs
tantial horizontal disparities across local
governments when carried out on a
derivation (i.e. origin basis). Fortunately,
this has generally been avoided in Latin
American countries.61 An important
exception has been the revenue sharing
in natural resources, which in countries
such as Peru and Ecuador is funda
mentally implemented on a derivation
basis. This has led to significant
horizontal disparities among municipa
lities.62 In most Latin American countries
fiscal transfers from revenue sharing
are distributed according to a set of
parameters or formulas that try to
achieve several objectives, one of which
is some degree of equalization. One of
the positive aspects of revenue sharing is
that it manages to combine the uncon
ditional use of funds with rather plentiful
sources of revenue.
The main problem with general revenue
sharing is that there is some confusion over
the exact achievement of distribution
formulas; pursuing many objectives with
essentially one instrument tends to be the
source of that confusion. It isn't always best
to give local governments the unconditional

60. For example,
reportedly In the case
of El Salvador municipal
fees and charges date
from 1954.
61. Note that this does not
mean that there are no
significant regional
disparities in the region;
it simply means that the
more frequent use of
the derivation would
have made things
worse. As discussed
above, regional fiscal
dispahbes arise from
the differences in
economic bases and the
more tax autonomy
provided, the higher the
potential for enlarged
fiscal disparities which
require a higher need
equalization grants.
62. In the case of Peru, the
evolution of
international prices for
natural resources had a
significant impact on the
transfers system. The
Ministry of Economy
and Finance (MEF)
currently shares 50
percent of mining and
hydrocarbon revenues
with local governments.
Transfers from central
government to regional/
local governments
increased exponentially
after 2000 but
plummeted in 2009.
This experience has
given rise to very
significant horizontal
imbalances between
municipalities because
shares of mining
revenues are highly
concentrated on seven
departments,
accounting for close to
80 percent of the total.
This has created
problems with increased
unspent balances during
the boom years and it
has continued to expose
local governments to
high volatility in revenue
streams.
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63. The point is to quickly
achieve a more
appropriate mix of
unconditional and
conditional grants,
without losing sight of
the fact that, in the long
term, it is desirable to
increase unconditional
local governments
funding.
64. Some exceptions include
Chile's revenue
equalization grant.

use of all of these funds.63 The reforms
being introduced or contemplated in some
Latin
American
countries
consist
fundamentally of the unbundling of the
revenue sharing system into two additional
separate transfer mechanisms, namely: (i)
an equalization transfer with unconditional
use of funds and financed from a pool
extracted from the shared revenues, which
would exclusively pursue the goal of
equalization of horizontal fiscal disparities,
or (ii) a system of specific or conditional
grants
for
current expenditure and
investment purposes, financed with some of
the revenue sharing funds. The use of these
funds would be earmarked in pursuit of a
variety of sectored objectives. Advances in
this general direction have been made in
countries like Brazil and Chile, while
countries like Ecuador, El Salvador and
Honduras are still using an unbundled
revenue sharing scheme as the main
funding source of local governments.

collections are often used instead of
measures of tax capacity, thereby creating
a negative incentive for tax effort. The
current methods used to incorporate
different expenditure needs in the revenue
sharing formulas are also problematic. For
example, population, which is commonly
used as a good approximation for some
services needs, is not the right factor to be
for
other
services.
For
considered
example, the number of school age
children provides a better approximation
for basic education needs than population
as a whole. The relative share of infants
and the elderly in the population provides
a better approximation for health care
needs than the whole population per se. In
some cases, especially in Central American
countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua,
the
existing
formulas
favor
small
municipalities, which in turn create pro
blems of fairness and economic viability
and regional development.

The need to rationalize the transfer
system

Even though many countries have some
form of conditional grants, they lack
structure and consistency, especially in
the area of capital grants. When
conditional
grants
are
used,
the
complex system is often a problem.65
Compliance-administrative
costs
by
local governments which is intricate, in
many
cases
penalizes
smaller
jurisdictions with low administrative
capacity and dilutes the achievement of
central government goals. A remedy to
these problems, following best inter
national
practice,
has
been
to
consolidate many of these specific or
conditional programs into block grants.
While specific conditional grants narrow
the use of funds (e.g. funds to buy
furniture for primary schools), block
grants, while still conditional, have a
much broader scope for the use of funds
(e.g., the funds must be spent on
primary education). The advantages to

The system of transfers plays a pivotal role
in drawing together the other elements of
the intergovernmental fiscal system. It
makes up for the vertical and horizontal
gaps that own source revenues and
revenue sharing cannot meet, and when it
is designed properly it does not undermine
local tax effort or the incentives for
creditworthy municipalities to borrow.
With the exception of a few countries, the
current system of transfers to local
governments in Latin America lacks a clear
orientation. Most countries have yet to
introduce unconditional equalization grants
that
incorporate
some
formula-based
measures for expenditure needs and fiscal
capacity.64
When
some
equalization
elements are introduced into the
revenue sharing formulas, actual revenue
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using just a few block grants are the
simplification and expansion of local
government choices, thus aligning the
final allocation of public resources more
closely to the priorities of individual
local governments (e.g., repairing
the school building instead of buying
new
furniture),
without
unduly
compromising the general goals of
central government's policies (e.g.,
promoting the quality and standards of
primary education in the country).
Increasing fiscally responsible local
borrowing

Historically, the Latin American region
has suffered some of the worst incidences
of fiscally irresponsible sub-national
borrowing in the world. The negative
experiences of Brazil and Argentina,
with uncontrolled sub-national borrowing
and hyperinflation during the 1980s and
1990s, are still examples of what can go
wrong in this area of sub-national finance.
One consequence of those experiences is
that the borrowing policy towards local
governments in the region has become
excessively conservative and restrictive.
For example, in Chile, local governments
are —in principle— not allowed to borrow or
take out loans of any kind, but either way
outright prohibition is unnecessary or
effective. In the same country, indirect
borrowing through leasing contracts or by
delaying the payment of current ex
penditure makes that norm difficult to
enforce. In Uruguay, any domestic or
foreign debt issued by a local government
needs to be approved by the national
congress. Peru also provides an example of
legislative conservatism in the matter of
local borrowing: The central government
has established indebtedness rules to
maintain fiscal prudence by two laws (the
Law on Fiscal Prudence and Transparency

-LPTF- and the Law on Fiscal Responsibility
and Transparency -LRTF-). Besides limits
on debt service ratios and total debt, the
laws also limited the rate of growth for
municipal expenditures to a maximum of 3
percent per year. However, this framework
has not been fully enforced because of
insufficient monitoring, and the lack of
effective sanctions. Many local governments
in Peru carry large budgetary arrears. At the
other extreme, and more like an exception,
Paraguay, has practically no restriction on
local borrowing.
Thus a pending challenge for several
countries in the region is how to set up
institutions that effectively regulate borrowing
without becoming overly restrictive of local
governments. Many countries are still
struggling to introduce a credible system
of penalties for lack of compliance. The
development of information and monitoring
systems covering all aspects of borrowing,65
including budgetary arrears with official
institutions and private providers, is urgently
needed. But the key ingredient for fiscally
responsible behavior of sub-national units
remains at the political will of the central
government authorities to implement the
existing regulatory frameworks.
A second challenge for practically all
countries is how to make more credit
available to
local governments for
responsible borrowing.66 In practice, the
level of borrowing by local governments in
Latin America is far too low to meet the
present large needs for public infrastruc
ture across the sub-continent.67 The ex
ceptions are large cities, which tend to
have ample access to domestic credit
markets
and
in
many
cases
to
international markets with accompanying
international credit ratings. Thus, the
capital cities of La Paz (Bolivia) and Lima
(Peru) display a very different picture from
that of most other municipalities.

65. Monitoring systems for
local indebtedness
have often proved a
doubtful utility. In
Ecuador and Peru
information on debt is
taken directly from the
financial statements of
sub-national
governments and is
not crosschecked with
other sources. In
Argentina, the Federal
Council for Fiscal
Responsibility created
by the Fiscal
Responsibility Law of
2004 and in charge of
monitoring compliance
with norms and rules
of fiscal and financial
behavior does not
receive timely
information from the
majority municipalities
as of2009.
66. Part of the solution can
be direct on-lending to
municipalities by
regional-multinational
institutions such as the
[Confederation Andina
de Fomento] (CAF) or
[the Banco
Centroamericano de
Inversiones], or
international
organizations such as
the Inter-American
Development Bank
(IDB) or the World
Bank. However, a
large part of the
solution needs to be
the mobilization of
domestic credit
sources.
67. Brazil is an exception.
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The absence of real access to borrowing by
the average municipality in the region is a
complex issue. It is explained by a multitude
of causes, ranging from the lack of tax
autonomy for local governments to the lack of
national financial market development. One
potential remedy for the scarcity of local
credit is the creation of semi-official financial
intermediaries or municipal banks.68 As
shown in Box 6.5, several Latin American
countries have created this type of institution
to facilitate long-term credit to local
governments. However, the experience of

these institutions has been mixed because of
the difficulty of maintaining them at arms'
length from central government officials and
of operating them with strict banking criteria.

Issues on the Budget Process and
Transparency
Streamlining the Budget Process at the
Local Level

Budgets and the budget process at the
local level in Latin America have improved

Box 6.5. Practice with Municipal Development Banks and Funds in Latin America69
Experience with municipal development banks in Latin America has been mixed, as has
been the case in many other countries around the world. Although quite a few countries
have introduced some sort of specialized financial intermediaries or municipal
development funds to raise capital financing for local governments, few of those
institutions have been transformed into financial institutions with market-oriented
practices and controls channelling private savings to finance public infrastructure. The
following is a summary of experiences with municipal development banks and funds in
the Latin America region.
68. Central governments
also guarantee
on-lending to local
governments from
multilateral
International
organizations,
including the World
Bank, the IDB, and
CAF.
69. See Peterson (1996).
There are other
relevant initiatives in
the region that for
space reasons are not
developed in this box,
including the Banco
del Estado (BEDE) in
Ecuador and La Caixa
in Brazil. At the
regional level the CAF
and the IDB have
been active supporters
of on-lending
programs for the
development of local
public infrastructure.

Brazil

The Integrated Program of State Improvements (PIMES) was established as a municipal
development fund administered by BADESUL, the development bank of the Rio Grande do
Sul, which owns and controls it. The program has two components: institutional and human
resource development and infrastructure investments. The first component comprises of
about 10 percent of the total project costs and includes technical assistance, training and
equipment for municipalities, the State Water Company (CORSAN), and other state sector
agencies, etc. The second component represents about 90 percent of the total program
budget and includes the financing of projects in water supply and sanitation, street paving
and lighting, drainage and erosion control, and so on. The Municipal Action Program (PRAM)
was established in 1991 by the Parana state bank BANESTADO, which originally served as
the bank's financial agent. PRAM was eventually converted into a revolving State Urban
Development Fund (FDU), administered by BANESTADO with technical assistance provided
by a legally autonomous organization that in practice functions as a department of the State
of Parana Secretariat of Planning.
PARANACIDADE was created in 1996 as a non-profit corporate entity to provide
institutional and technical services to municipalities in Parana; this institution also
collects and invests financial resources from the state's urban and regional development
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significantly in recent times. A noteworthy
innovation has been the introduction of
participatory budgeting (See Box 6.6).
Nevertheless, a variety of issues at diffe
rent stages of the budget process still
need to be addressed in several countries
in the region. In terms of budget planning
and formulation, there are still countries
where local governments must have their
budgets, or certain aspects of them, approved
on an annual basis by higher levels of
government.70 Ex-ante monitoring and
approval of local budgets by higher level

m

authorities is not needed where there are
local elected councils and an effective expost audit system, and courts to address
irregularities. Local budget autonomy is
often limited in the case of investment
projects.71 Another issue in the prepa
ration stage is the lack of a link between
planning and budgeting. Frequently, it is
seen that many development plans at the
local, regional, and national levels lack
coordination and do not relate to actual
budgets in terms of the cost of activities
for the fulfillment of strategic objectives.

Practice with Municipal Development Banks and Funds in Latin America (cont.)
programs, managing the State Urban Development Fund (FDU), which creates loans for
municipalities at maturity ranging from 8 years for urban infrastructure to 10 years for
social infrastructure. One of the main explanations for PARANACIDADE's success is its
support of capacity building for municipalities.
Colombia

Colombia has been successful in using its Municipal Development Funds to accelerate the
development of private credit markets for local government. The Territorial Financing
Institution (FINDETER), which began in 1994 as an infrastructure financing window within
the National Mortgage Bank, eventually evolved into a development bank for municipalities,
working through the commercial banking system. In essence, FINDETER operates as a
second-level financing institution which re-discounts commercial bank loans to
municipalities. The banks' good credit experience through FINDETER has led them to
commit their own resources to municipal lending. Intermediate-sized cities and
departments in Colombia now borrow primarily through commercial bank loans, while small
cities and towns continue to rely on FINDETER. The largest cities now finance their credit
requirements primarily through bonds.
Mexico

The federal public works bank, BANOBRAS, was founded in 1933 as the Banco Nacional
Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras Publicas, S.A (National Urban Mortgage and Public Works
Bank), and has long had a loan program for municipal development. Its operations,
however, became complex and bureaucratic and the allocation of financial resources soon
responded more to political than financial criteria. The bank's heavily subsidized loan
program used to focus on social housing, water supply systems and the construction of
markets and abattoirs. Since 1988, its interest rates have come close to market rates and
BANOBRAS has switched its focus to improvements of municipal land registers.

70. These countries
include: Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay.
71. In Peru all public
investment projects
must be approved by
the National Public
Investment System
(SNIP) which is
managed by the
Ministry of Economy
and Finance (MEF).
Through the General
Directorate of MultiSector Programming
(DGPM), MEF has the
power to cancel any
approval made by
regional and local
governments if DGPM
consider that SNIP
criteria have not been
properly applied.
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In terms of budget execution, the
misappropriation of funds by central
government is still a problem in several
countries. For example, in Haiti, 90
percent of local government income
evidently comes from transfers associated
to the Funds for the Operation and
Development for the Territorial Collectives
(FGDCT), administered by the Department
of the Interior. However, recent studies
show that these funds are not being
distributed as the Department of the

Interior claims, and that a significant
share is retained by the Department to
finance its own projects. The budgets of
communes (i.e. the local governments in
Haiti) are the most directly hurt, receiving
33 percent less than what they are
budgeted to receive. Honduras provides
another example, where the law is not
respected by the central authorities. In
particular, while the Municipal Code
establishes that the central government
should allocate 5 percent of its tax

Box 6.6. Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre (Brazil)72
Participatory budgeting has been functioning successfully in the municipality of Porto
Alegre, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) for the last two decades. The
participatory budget of Porto Alegre, called OPPA, is a process through which ordinary
citizens and a team of elected local government officials work together to define a list of
projects to be included within the local government budget. Through this mechanism for
the shared management of budgetary resources, local residents perform the role of
identifying and controlling the implementation of projects. Thus, through the OPPA,
local residents are closely associated with the formulation of public policy at the initial
stages, including diagnosis and needs assessment, the intermediate phase of
monitoring and implementation, and the final phase of control and accountability.

72. See
http://www.internatio
na /budget,org/ for
other experiences in
participatory
budgeting and other
innovations for more
open and transparent
budgeting practices.

Since its inception the OPPA has contributed to the improvements in the lives of local
residents. The number of participants in Porto Alegre has increased year by year, from
approximately 1,000 in 1990 to nearly 15,000 in 2004. The process has also brought
opportunities to better integrate traditionally marginalized groups of the population in
the community's development. In 2002, there was a predominance of women among
the leaders of neighbourhood associations, delegates and counselors. In addition, most
of the OPPA participants belong to lower income groups. Other groups, such as the black
population or, manual and unskilled workers have also seen higher participation rates in
the OPPA process (City, 2003). According to Abers (2000), who studied the profile of
OPPA's participants, contrary to some expectations, the process has not given rise to the
influence of an elite field of people with more education or income. In addition, Santos
(2003) has shown that OPPA resulted in an increase in the provision of basic public
services. In 1999 the volume of garbage collected and the number of additional lights
installed nearly doubled from the annual average for the period prior to the existence of
OPPA (1985-1988). In 1996, the sewer lines in the municipality were expanded to cover
98 percent of households up from a coverage of about 50 percent in 1989. The World
Bank (1999) also attributed to OPPA the paving of half of the municipality streets and
the doubling in the number of students enrolled in primary and secondary schools.
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revenue to the municipalities, in fact, only
3 percent appears to have been allocated
in the most recent years.73 Other
countries, like the Dominican Republic, are
experimenting with similar situations; 10
percent of their national budget must be
allocated to local governments (according
to Law 166-03), but actual transfers have
never reached this level and recently they
have decreased from 8 percent to 6
percent of the national budget.
Deficiencies related to ex-post audit of lo
cal budgets still exist.74 For example, in
Paraguay, many municipalities do not
comply with the requirement to send their
annual financial reports to the Comptroller
General of the Republic.
Addressing the Scarcity of Data on Local
Finance
The lack of adequate data on local finance
is a widespread problem in the region
which has major consequences. Only a
handful of countries currently make muni

cipal data openly available to the public.
Countries, such as Brazil, Peru and
Ecuador provide examples for best
practice in this area; for further examples
in the region see Box 6.7.
Conclusions
The analysis in the above sections has
shown that the Latin America region
contains a rich variety of experiences and
lessons, good and bad, about de
centralization and municipal finance. This
assortment of experiences and challenges,
sometimes quite unique,75 has made it
difficult to draw up a cross-country
analysis. Nevertheless, there are many
common themes and challenges facing
municipal governments in Latin America
and each country has been able to address
them with varying degrees of success. For
example, in Chile, the central government
has made use of municipal governments'
ability to increase the effectiveness of
social policies and encourage innovation
and competition among them. In Colombia,

Box 6.7. Annual Publication of Executed Budgets in Colombia
Law 617, enacted in 2000, charges the National Planning Department (DNP) in Colombia
with the annual publication of budget results (revenues, expenditures and financial
indicators) for all departments and municipalities, together with an explanation of where
there have been problems and where there has been progress. Included in these records
is a detailed recording of the municipalities' fiscal performance and information on all
income and expenditures during the past fiscal year. This annual publication is of high
quality. The DNP collects annual data on revenues and expenditures, as well as the debt
levels of all local governments. Each local government reports and certifies the accuracy
of its executed budgets to the DNP through an automated system, the Sistema de
Information para la Captura de la Ejecucion Presupuestal de Departamentos y
Munitipios (SICEP). The DNP also receives information on debt levels from the
Controtoria General de la Republics (CGR). These data are regularly used by
government institutions and nongovernmental organizations to monitor the
performance of sub-national governments. The comparisons in performance also allow
some form of benchmarking competition among local governments; which governments
are doing relatively better and which are doing worse.

73. See Cardona (2006).
74. In 61 Salvador and
other countries in the
region, municipalities
are required to
undergo a full
independent audit
once a year to search
for signs of corruption
and misuse of public
funds. This practice
does not eliminate
corruption but it goes
a long way to keep it
under control.
75. For example, the
challenges faced by
some municipalities in
Colombia go beyond
fiscal issues. Here,
municipalities in the
war-tom areas must
face the challenge of
being on the frontlines
against armed actors
such as drug
traffickers,
paramilitaries and the
Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia
(FARC).
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central legislation can provide admini
strative flexibility, with local governments
exercising control over staff hiring and
salary decisions, and at the same time
provide effective accountability mechanisms
to maintain fiscally responsible decisions
by local officials. In Honduras, a municipal
association
can
successfully
provide
technical assistance and training for its
members. Changes in the attitudes of
municipal
officials
toward
broader
community participation in budget deci
sions have taken place in countries such as
Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru.
In this concluding section we offer some
observations grouped according to the
set of issues examined. Yet, there are
challenges
remaining
which
need
addressing and it will be necessary to
continue looking for new orientations in
future research about public local finances
in the region.

Observations on Organizational
Structure
Countries with problems of fragmentation
and small municipalities, should introduce
legislation and practical support for the
creation of associations of municipalities
into mancomunidades for the delivery of
certain public services requiring a certain
minimum scale. Other solutions to the
problem of insufficient scale that could be
pursued include cooperative services
agreements between larger and smaller
municipalities, and the contracting of
services with private enterprises for the
delivery of services. In addition, careful
critical study and consideration should be
given to the creation of new tiers of
vertical
government
(for
example,
regional governments) as a solution to
some of the weaknesses observed at the
existing local governments. A cheaper
more efficient solution can be the

strengthening of technical assistance
and additional funding of existing governments.
In any case, existing potential incentives
to further fragmentation should be
removed. In particular, those countries
with transfer formulas that ensure the
same amount of funds to all municipalities
independently
of their
size
should
discontinue this practice. Where they do
not exist now, new legislation with
minimum population and fiscal viability
requirements should be introduced to
prevent
any
further
undesirable
fragmentation of local governments.
Most central governments in the region,
and provincial or state governments in the
case of federal systems, should devote
more time and resources to developing
administrative capacity, especially in the
case of small and rural local governments.
Some of this assistance can be provided
by working together with and offering
support to municipal associations in order
to give quantitative and qualitative
technical assistance and training to local
officials in the most cost-effective
manner or by having regional universities
and colleges contracted to tutor local
governments.

Observations on Intergovernmental
Fiscal System Design
Without a clear assignment of expenditure
responsibilities to local governments it is
not possible to have an informed judgment
on whether or not the level of financing of
these governments is adequate. Most
systems
of
intergovernmental
fiscal
relations in the region would benefit from
an
explicit
clarification
of
the
competencies assigned to local govern
ments. First, this will require the clear
identification of the exclusive respon
sibilities of local governments. Second, in
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the case of concurrent or shared
responsibilities between the local and
central (or intermediate level) govern
ments, it will be necessary to identify
which attributes of the particular com
petence
(regulation,
financing,
and
implementation) are the responsibility of
the local governments and which belong to
higher levels of government. There will be
no clear assignment of responsibilities,
especially in the case of concurrent
functions, until it is apparent which level of
government is exclusively responsible for
the different sub-functions involved. Of
course, the implementation of services
may be done directly by the local
jurisdiction or this unit can make
arrangements for its provision, for
example by a private company or some
other jurisdiction.
If there are significant differences in ad
ministrative capacity among local govern
ments it may be desirable to temporarily
introduce two or at most three different
packages of expenditure responsibilities
that can be devolved to local governments
depending on their administrative capaci
ties and over time, as capacity is acquired,
graduate municipalities to the more com
plete levels of responsibility.

will lead to more fiscally responsible and
politically accountable forms of decentrali
zation. Several options are open going
forward with this agenda.
•

First, countries that have not assigned
property tax to local governments
should do so. Property tax has several
characteristics that make it ideal as a
local tax.

•

Second, other taxes that should be
assigned to local governments are
vehicle taxes, business licenses, and
betterment levies on real estate for
financing basic infrastructure improve
ments.

•

Third, for countries that have not done
so, some degree of discretion in setting
tax rates should be granted to all local
governments so that they can adjust
their tax bases, within legislated
maximum and minimum rates. Other
forms of autonomy beyond rate setting
(e.g., adjustments to the tax base or
the freedom to introduce new taxes)
are not generally desirable.

•

Fourth, coordinated efforts of local and
central governments should be made to
increase the revenue yield of property
tax and other taxes assigned to local
governments. In the case of property
taxes, these should include: regularly
updated and improved property cadas
tres and property value assessment
methodologies, increased effectiveness
in the collection of tax bills, and
removal of disincentives for increases
in tax effort by local governments i.e.
reductions in transfers when more local
revenues are collected.

•

Fifth, the introduction of new taxes at
the local level should be considered,
including wider use of betterment

It would also be desirable to adopt
transparent approaches to translate the
assignment of local functional responsibi
lities into expenditure needs in order to
have a clear idea of the financing require
ments for local governments.
Greater local revenue autonomy is a
challenge not yet adequately addressed by
most countries in the region. However,
there is a need to find a better balance
between the decentralization of expen
diture responsibilities and the authority to
collect local taxes from the residents
directly benefiting from local services. This
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levies and local business taxation, such
as the ICA (impuesto de industria y
comercio) in Colombia or Chile's
patente municipal.

ensure national standards and objectives
in the provision of important services have
been decentralized, such as in education
and health.

Going forward, to improve the direction of
increased local tax autonomy, would be
the introduction of a local piggy-back
personal income tax with a flat rate
collection at the same time national
income tax is collected. This latter form of
local tax is common, in northern and
central Europe, but it is yet to be tried in
the Latin American region. Finally, there is
a
possibility
of
considering
the
introduction of environmental or "green"
taxes enabled by national legislation on
the regulation of the environment. This
form of taxation has not taken root in
many Latin American countries though it
provides several important advantages.
The first is the so-called "double dividend"
since these taxes not only collect needed
revenues but also contribute a cleaner
environment. These taxes can also fit well
in regional and local contexts. Potential
levies in this area would include taxes on
the emission of solid waste and water
contamination.

In those countries where local borrowing is
not allowed, new legislation should
introduce the possibility of responsible
local borrowing. In those countries that
already allow municipal borrowing, it
would be desirable in many cases to
review the current status of regulations,
streamlining them when necessary so that
they are not overly restrictive. This review
should also focus on the monitoring
capabilities of the central government
(including "floating debt" or budgetary
arrears with official institutions and
private suppliers, and guarantees through
municipal
enterprises)
and
the
introduction of a credible system of
penalties for lack of compliance.

In those countries where revenue sharing
is a major source of local finance, it would
be desirable to un-bundle part of the
revenue sharing system into separate
transfers, including: (i) an equalization
transfer with unconditional use of funds
and (ii) a system of block conditional
grants for current and capital purposes. An
explicit unconditional equalization grant is
needed to address the important and
increasing problem of regional fiscal
disparities in many countries in the
region—based on differences in tax
capacity
or
economic
base,
and
differences in expenditure needs due to
geography or the population structure.
Explicit conditional grants are necessary to

Beyond the regulation and monitoring of
local borrowing, an even more important
challenge for most countries in the region
is to facilitate a significant increase in
credit availability to local governments for
responsible borrowing, especially for
smaller municipalities. The solution may
sometimes be the creation of official
financial intermediaries or municipal
banks. A large amount of information is
available within Latin America and other
regions of the world regarding the positive
features institutions should replicate (e.g.,
operating with strict banking criteria) and
those features that should be avoided
(e.g., operating with less than arms'
length distance from political authorities).
Policies to encourage the development of
private markets for local credit are equally,
or even more, desirable. But it must be
recognized that local credit from private
sources is unlikely to develop without
more revenue autonomy and greater
transparency of local budgets.
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Observations on Budget Process and
Transparency

Those countries still requiring ex-ante
approval of municipal budgets by higher-level
authorities should phase out this practice
and increasingly rely on local
accountability and effectiveness of ex-post
audits and the rule of law in order to keep
an eye on the probity of local budget
execution. The misappropriation of funds
in a selected number of countries is a
practice that needs to be stopped and full
compliance with ex-post audit rules should
be ensured. The ultimate effectiveness of
local public expenditures will depend on
the adoption of modern budget evaluation
practices, which remains a pending
assignment for most countries in the
region.
The low reliability on municipal finances
remains an important problem in the Latin
American region, affecting the quality of

policy design and of analytical work. Best
practice in budget transparency and data
dissemination in countries such as
Colombia and Peru, for example, should be
replicated by all countries in the region
where publicly available data on annual
budgets and other aspects of the local
finances are still missing. An effective way
to encourage and sustain good practices in
budget reporting and data generation is to
make good use of the data, by providing
information to experts and ordinary
citizens on performance and by publicizing
the results in order to create benchmark
competition across jurisdictions.
There has been continued progress over
the past decade with the institutions that
manage finances and with the practice
itself of municipal finance in the Latin
American region. Nevertheless, there is a
long road ahead for further improving the
overall efficiency, equity, and accountabi
lity of municipal finances in the region.
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Latin America Regional Policy Recommendations
Prepared by the technical team of the Federacion Latinoamericana de Ciudades,
Municipios y Asociaciones (FLACMA), March 2010.
Signs of recentralization in Latin America

In various countries a backward trend has been observed with regard to decisions taken
on the handover of responsibilities to local governments, affecting both local autonomy
and financing.
National transfers to local governments must be stable and regular

Financial transfers to local government are a mechanism to effectively integrate
municipal participation into the national budget and constitute a right for citizens of
territories. Universal services such as education and health are nationally designed and
financed to ensure equality between territories and, when managed by local
governments, merit regular and stable national transfers.
Strengthen collection and take into account the fiscal effort of local governments with
regard to local poverty levels

It is often argued that local governments are "fiscally lazy" and invest little in tax
collection. These observations do not consider the low yield of economic activity and
level of poverty in the majority of Latin American municipalities. As a result, levels of
collection in poor areas are often confused with the efforts made to achieve them. To
complement these fiscal efforts, systems of income compensation should be favored,
such as unconditional transfers from central to local governments that permit a
redistribution of resources in favor of more vulnerable, lower income territories.
Increase the participation of local governments in public spending and their autonomy
in the management of resources

It is a recurrent theme in Latin America to measure the level of decentralization of diverse
countries with indicators such as local expenditure as a percentage of general government
spending or local expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Such fiscal observations must be
balanced against real levels of local government autonomy in deciding how financial
resources will be used, be they collected directly by the local government or transferred
from the central level. In addition, access to information on municipal finance must be
improved as well as the methodologies for collecting and recording this information.
Promote association and cooperation between municipalities to strengthen municipal
capacities

In Latin America and the Caribbean there are more than 16 million local governments.
Analyzing, by country, the total number of Latin American municipalities this is not

Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy
GOLD 2010

necessarily excessive to respond to the needs of citizens. However, there are significant
differences in both the sizes and characteristics of these entities, depending on the country
and type of territory as well as the municipal human and financial resources. The most
effective manner to balance municipal capacity - without reorganizing the territorial and
institutional structure in each country - is through municipal associative movements, that is to
say, to encourage inter-municipal cooperation. "Mancomunidades" allow local governments to
mutually support each other, manage services jointly, and undertake local development
programs and projects.
Increase the sources of own revenues for local government

In Latin America the main sources of municipal income -apart from fees and tariffs for
municipal services- are property taxes, business and commercial licenses, vehicle taxes,
development charges and transfer systems for equalization purposes to strengthen
incomes for less developed municipalities. Property tax is the most common, and is in
use across all of Latin America, with some exceptions such as the Dominican Republic,
and El Salvador. It is necessary to improve and increase the sources of own revenue for
local governments.
Prioritize strengthening and improved functioning of local governments

It is very important for the success of the decentralization process that local governments
are effectively strengthened, helping them to better exercise their powers and
responsibilities and provide good levels of services.
Improve coordination between ministries and national institutions responsible for
sectoral policy and local government; the transfer of responsibilities must be
accompanied by corresponding resources

One of the most common conflicts in public policy is that of aligning the generally sectoral
visions of national ministries, with the territorial optic of local governments. Municipalities
are often assigned partial responsibilities, from national ministries, without the necessary
resources to successfully implement them.
Recognize and strengthen the role of local government associations

Local government associations are an important supporting structure for municipal
management. The national associations allow for the design and discussion of national
policies and regulations on decentralization and local responsibilities, with central
government and parliament; the departmental, regional or intermediary municipal
associations play a similar role with intermediary governments, and also provide technical
support to member governments.

